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1. Introduction 
 
The recent decades have witnessed major changes in the financial sectors of developed and 
developing countries.
1 Generally, we have seen a drastic increase in the degree of financial 
intermediation and the development of new financial instruments, triggered by national and 
international legal liberalisation and by the development of communication technologies. 
With respect to the business sector, a change in the financial structure towards an increasing 
importance of capital-market based finance compared to bank-based finance has taken place. 
This development has been associated with an increasing activity of commercial banks in 
non-credit financial business and increasing financial activity of the non-financial business 
sector. Finally, the power of shareholders in joint stock companies seems to have increased 
relative to management and labourers. Whereas nowadays there seems to exist a broad 
consensus among macroeconomists of different schools saying that the development of the 
financial sector of an economy is crucial for its real economic growth, there remains equally 
wide disagreement as to which kind of financial structure and institutions are conducive to 
growth, and which are not. Therefore, it comes with no surprise that also the effects of the 
recent trends in the development of the financial sector, which can broadly be described as 
‘financialisation’, on distribution and growth are viewed differently.
2
In the present paper we will assess the macroeconomic effects of ‘financialisation’ applying 
two different variants of a Kaleckian model of distribution and growth. For this purpose 
changes in distribution and changes in behaviour of firms and households associated with 
‘financialisation’ are of interest. As far as distribution is concerned, ‘financialisation’ means 
an increase in the income share of rentiers, in particular a rise in rentiers’ income from 
                                                 
1 See for example the overview in Eatwell/Taylor (2000). 
2 See the surveys by Arestis/Sawyer (2005a), Demetriadis/Adrianova (2004), Hein (2005), Levine (2003, 2005), 
as well as the comments by Zingales (2003).   3
dividends, at the expense of firms’ retained profits or wage income.
3 Financialisation may 
also be accompanied by rising management salaries at the expense of the wages of ordinary 
workers. Assuming different propensities to save from rentiers’, managements’ and workers’ 
incomes, redistribution will affect consumption, and it will also affect investment through 
different channels. Therefore, the distributional effects of ‘financialisation’ will have a major 
impact on growth. A further effect on growth is related to changes in behaviour of firms and 
households caused or facilitated by ‘financialisation’. Increasing shareholder power enforces 
rising ‘shareholder value orientation’ on the firms’ management and its real investment 
decisions. The management’s preference for growth (‘retain and invest’) is gradually replaced 
by the shareholders’ preference for income (‘downsize and distribute’). Finally, new financial 
instruments and increasing ‘virtual wealth’, associated with appreciation of stock market 
prices caused by ‘shareholder value orientation’ of management, might reduce the propensity 
to save from the actual income flows going to households. In this paper we will focus on the 
macroeconomic effects of changes in distribution between shareholders/rentiers, firms and 
workers, as well as on the effects of increasing ‘shareholder value orientation’ of 
management.  
The paper is organised as follows. In the second section we briefly review the integration of 
‘financialisation’ processes into Post-Keynesian models of distribution and growth. In the 
third section we present our basic model with two alternative accumulation functions which 
will give rise to a ‘Kaleckian model’ and a ‘Post-Kaleckian model’. For these two models the 
effects of an increase in shareholder power, indicated by an increase in the dividend rate, will 
be analysed in section four where we distinguish two cases with respect to distribution: 1. the 
dividend-inelastic mark-up with an increasing dividend rate at the expense of firms’ retained 
                                                 
3 On the empirics of financialisation and distribution see for example Argitis/Pitelis (2001, 2006), Epstein/Power 
(2003), Dumenil/Levy (2004, 2005), Epstein/Jayadev (2005), Power/Epstein/Abrena (2003) and Stockhammer 
(2004, 2005-6). 
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profits and 2. the dividend-elastic mark-up with a rising dividend rate at the expense of wage 
incomes. The fifth section summarises the main results and concludes. 
 
 
2. Financialisation in Post-Keynesian models 
 
Whereas the earlier Post-Keynesian and Kaleckian models of distribution and growth were 
missing an explicit introduction of monetary and financial variables, these variables have 
been introduced into those models since the late 1980s/early 1990s by different authors.
4 
However, the focus in these models mainly was on the introduction of the rate of interest – as 
an exogenous distribution parameter determined central bank policies – and bank credit 
created endogenously by a developed banking sector on demand by creditworthy borrowers. 
But recently, there have been some major attempts to introduce the processes of 
‘financialisation’ into Post-Keynesian distribution and growth models. These models have 
stressed different aspects of the financialisation process: 
First, the effects of financialisation on firms’ investment behaviour have been discussed 
extensively and analysed empirically by a number of authors. As a general proposition, it has 
been argued that policies of ‘retain and invest’ are likely to be gradually replaced by policies 
of ‘downsize and distribute’ in the process of financialisation (see Lazonick/O’Sullivan 
2000). In particular, Crotty (1990) has conceptualised an ‘owner-manager conflict’ at the firm 
level, with managers having very different objectives compared to shareholders: 
‘Management wants to maximize the size and power of the firm and the share of the primary 
markets in which it operates, not the current market value of the firm. It is interested in the 
status of the firm in the coming years and even in the coming decades, not just in short-term 
                                                 
4 See the contributions by, among others, Dutt (1989, 1992, 1995), Dutt/Amadeo (1993), Epstein (1992, 1994), 
Godley/Lavoie (2006), Hein (2006, 2007a, 2007b), Lavoie (1992: 347-371, 1993, 1995), Lavoie/Godley (2001-
2), Lavoie et al. (2004), Lima/Meirelles (2006), Smithin (2003a, 2003b), and Taylor (1985, 2004: 272-278). 
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profits’ (Crotty 1990: 533). Conversely, ‘if shareholders are not especially interested in the 
intermediate to long-term prospects of any individual enterprise because their portfolios are 
both diversified and in constant flux, they will not be particularly concerned with investment 
policy except with regard to its short-term impact on stock values’ (Crotty 1990: 535). 
Similarly, Stockhammer (2004, 2005-6) argues that firms typically face a ‘growth-profit 
trade-off’, with managements usually advocating growth (accumulation) and shareholders 
(short-term) profit maximisation. Stockhammer (2004) also presents econometric evidence in 
favour of ‘the hypothesis that financialisation caused a slowdown in accumulation. We found 
strong support for our hypothesis in the USA and France, some support in the UK, but none in 
Germany’ (Stockhammer 2004: 739). A similar view of shareholder value orientation 
underlies the theoretical analyses by Aglietta/Breton (2001) and Boyer (2000), where 
shareholders impose a ‘financial norm’ on managements which, ceteris paribus, affects 
investment adversely.  
A second aspect of financialisation stressed in various models is the link between wealth, 
household indebtedness and consumption. Dutt (2005, 2006) has analysed the effects of easier 
access to consumer credit within a Steindlian model of growth and income distribution. 
Credit-based consumption is facilitated by the ‘deregulation of the financial system allowing 
home equity lending, adjustable consumer loans and securitization […], and technological 
changes in credit reporting in the USA in the 1980s […]’ (Dutt 2006: 343). Bhaduri et al. 
(2006) also focus on the wealth-effect on consumption, implying that increases in financial 
wealth stimulate households’ willingness to consume. However, stock market wealth is purely 
‘virtual wealth (which) is realizable individually or on a micro-, but not collectively on a 
macro-scale’ (Bhaduri et al. 2006: 414). Clearly, were a sufficiently large number of 
shareholders to sell their stocks in order to increase consumption, stock prices would decline 
and virtual wealth be destroyed. Hence, ‘the institutional arrangements of an overdraft 
economy become essential to maintain a boom fuelled by credit rather than realized capital 
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gains’ (Bhaduri et al. 2006: 414). Of course, financial deregulation, as described by Dutt 
(2006), may improve the perspectives of maintaining a wealth-based credit boom over a 
considerable period of time.
5 Therefore, an important aspect of financialisation seems to be 
that, while physical accumulation tends to be weakened, wealth-based and credit-fuelled 
consumption becomes an increasingly important driving force of the overall economy. Some 
authors have even considered the possibility of a ‘finance-led growth regime’ (Boyer 2000), 
in which shareholder value orientation has a positive impact on investment and growth. The 
condition for this is a very high propensity to consume out of rentiers’ income and/or a very 
strong wealth effect on consumption, which in turn stimulates investment via the accelerator 
mechanism and overcompensates the direct negative effect of shareholder value orientation on 
investment (see also Aglietta 2000, Stockhammer 2005-6). 
Another important effect of financialisation that has been analysed by various authors 
concerns different forms of income redistribution. On the one hand, it may be expected that 
shareholders’ demand of higher distributed profits will be passed through to workers with the 
effect of a declining share of wages in national income (see Boyer 2000). On the other hand, a 
further implication of shareholder value orientation appears to be an increasing gap between 
manager wages and blue collar wages. Palley (2006) and Lavoie (2005) have analysed this 
phenomenon of ‘cadrisme’ (Lavoie 2005) within the framework of Post-Keynesian models of 
growth and distribution. In our view, shareholder value orientation is linked to this 
redistribution from blue collar to management wages, because, in effect, as mentioned above, 
management income is nowadays to a large extent ‘performance-related’, that is, closely 
linked to corporate profits and financial returns.  
                                                 
5 However, Bhaduri et al. (2006) show that it is well possible that the expansionary effects of consumer 
borrowing are overwhelmed in the long-run by rising interest obligations, which reduce households’ 
creditworthiness and may eventually require higher saving by households. In Dutt’s (2006) model, where the 
burden of servicing debt falls exclusively upon workers, the potentially contractionary long-run effect of 
consumer borrowing is corroborated because income is redistributed to the rich, who receive the interest income 
and have a lower propensity to consume. 
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In this paper we attempt to integrate some of these partial aspects of financialisation into the 
framework of a Kaleckian distribution and growth model. Our focus will be on the 
macroeconomic effects of changes in distribution between shareholders/rentiers, firms and 
workers, as well as on the effects of increasing ‘shareholder value orientation’ of management 
on firms’ investment. The analysis builds on some of our earlier extensions of traditional 
Post-Keynesian models with monetary and financial variables. Inspired by Lavoie (1993, 
1995), Hein (2006, 2007a) has introduced interest rates and debt into Kaleckian models of 
distribution and growth and has discussed the effects of changes in the interest rate on income 
distribution, capacity utilisation, capital accumulation and the profit rate. Also debt dynamics 
have been studied. In these models, ‘normal’ and ‘puzzling’ cases with respect to the real 
effects of changes in the interest rate are distinguished. In the ‘normal’ case, changes in the 
interest rate have adverse effects on the real equilibrium, and the long-term equilibrium debt-
capital ratio turns out to be unstable. The macroeconomic ‘paradox of debt’ may arise in this 
case. In the ‘puzzling’ case, changes in the interest rate are positively related to the real 
equilibrium values and the long-term equilibrium debt-capital ratio is stable. Van Treeck 
(2007) has applied the model by Hein (2007a), as well as Lavoie’s (1995) ‘Minsky-Steindl-
model’, and has distinguished dividend payments/income from interest payments/income in 
the investment and the saving function of the model. An ‘intermediate’ case, already inherent 
in Hein’s (2006, 2007a) and Lavoie’s (1995) models, but not explicitly discussed there, is of 
special interest. In this ‘intermediate case’, rising interest or dividend payments of firms to 
rentiers are associated with a rising profit rate (and with a rising rate of capacity utilisation in 
the extension of Hein’s (2007a) model), but with a falling rate of capital accumulation. Given 
a specific parameter constellation ‘rising profits and falling investment’, or a ‘neo-liberal 
regime’, seems to be a viable medium-run accumulation constellation. However, van Treeck 
(2007) has not integrated the effects of changes in interest and dividend payments on the 
firms’ mark-up and hence on the distribution between capital and labour income. Therefore, 
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in the present paper we further develop our approaches and take into account these 
distribution effects. Financialisation processes will be integrated into two different variants of 
the Kaleckian distribution and growth models, a first one with a basic investment function in 
the spirit of Kalecki (1954) himself, and a second one based on the Post-Kaleckian investment 
function of Bhaduri/Marglin (1990). 
 
 
3. The basic model 
 
We assume a closed economy without economic activity of the state. Under given conditions 
of production, there is just one type of commodity produced which can be used for 
consumption and investment purposes. There is a constant relation between the employed 
volume of labour (L) and real output (Y), i.e. there is no overhead-labour and no technical 
change, so that we get a constant labour-output-ratio (l). The capital-potential output-ratio (v), 
the relation between the real capital stock (K) and potential real output (Y
v), is also constant. 
The capital stock is assumed not to depreciate. The rate of capacity utilisation (u) is given by 
the relation between actual real output and potential real output. The basic model can be 
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Writing w for the nominal wage rate, we assume that firms set prices (p) according to a mark-
up (m) on constant unit labour costs up to full capacity output with the mark-up being 
determined by the degree of price competition in the goods markets and by the relative 
powers of capital and labour in the labour market (equation 1). The profit share (h), i.e. the 
proportion of profits (Π) in nominal output (pY), is therefore determined by the mark-up 
(equation 2). The profit rate (r) relates the annual flow of profits to the nominal capital stock 
(equation 3). 
The pace of accumulation in our model is determined by firms’ decisions to invest, 
independently of saving, because firms have access to short-term (or initial) finance for 
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production purposes supplied by a developed banking sector.
6 We assume that long-term 
finance of the capital stock consists of firms’ accumulated retained earnings (E
F), long-term 
credit granted by rentiers’ households (directly or through banks) (B) or equity issued by the 
firms and held by rentiers’ household (E
R).  φ γ λ , ,  are the debt-capital-ratio, the rentiers’ 
equity-capital-ratio and the accumulated retained earnings-capital ratio, respectively 
(equations 5-7). We assume these ratios to be constant for the purpose of our following 
analysis. Total profits (Π) split into firms’ retained profits (Π
F), on the one hand, and 
dividends paid on equity held by rentiers (R
d) as well as interest paid on debt (R
i) also 
accruing to rentiers’ households, on the other hand (equation 8).  
Interest payments to rentiers’ households are given by the rate of interest (i) and the stock of 
debt (equation 9), with the rate of interest as a distribution parameter being an exogenous 
variable mainly determined by monetary policies, following the Post-Keynesian 
‘horizontalist’ view of endogenous money and credit, pioneered by Kaldor (1970, 1982, 
1985), Lavoie (1984, 1992: 149-216, 1996) and Moore (1988, 1989).
7 Dividend payments are 
given by the dividend rate (d) and the stock of equity held by rentiers’ households. We 
consider the dividend rate to be an exogenous variable as well. It is determined by the power 
struggle between rentiers (shareholders) and firms (management) with the rentiers being 
interested in high dividends for income purposes and the management being in favour of 
retained earnings for firms’ real investment and growth purposes.  
Changes in the interest rate and in the dividend rate may be associated with a change in the 
mark-up in firms’ pricing in incompletely competitive goods market (equation 1), depending 
on the degree of competition in the goods market and the power of workers and labour unions 
                                                 
6 The distinction between short-term (or initial) finance for production purposes and long-term (or final) finance 
for investment purposes, not dealt with in the present paper, can be found in the monetary circuit approach 
(Graziani 1989, 1994, Lavoie 1992: 151-169, Seccareccia 1996, 2003, Hein 2007b: chapter 10.2). 
7 In this view, the central bank controls the base rate of interest. Commercial banks set the market rate of interest 
by marking up the base rate, with the mark-up being affected by liquidity and risk assessments and by the degree 
of competition in the commercial banking sector, and then supply the credit demand of consumers and investors 
they consider creditworthy at this interest rate. The central bank accommodates the necessary amount of cash. 
For a survey of the Post-Keynesian endogenous money view and its implementation into Post-Keynesian models 
of distribution and growth see Hein (2007b). 
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in the labour market. If these changes occur, distribution between gross profits as the sum of 
retained profits, interest and dividends, on the one hand, and wages, on the other hand, will be 
affected (equation 2). Discussing the effects of a rising dividend rate in the following section, 
we will distinguish two cases: 1. the dividend-inelastic mark-up in which a rising dividend 
rate leaves the profit share in national income untouched and only affects firms’ retained 
profits adversely, and 2. the dividend-elastic mark-up in which an increasing dividend rate 
affects distribution between gross profits and wages. The first case is likely to occur under the 
conditions of a high degree of competition in the goods market and strong labour unions in 
the labour market. The second case will emerge with a low degree of competition in the goods 
market and weak bargaining power of labour unions. 
We assume a classical saving hypothesis, i.e. labourers do not save. The part of profits 
retained is completely saved by definition. The part of profits distributed to rentiers’ 
households, i.e. the interest and dividend payments, is used by those households according to 
their propensity to save (sR). Therefore, we get the saving rate (σ) in equation (11) which 
relates total saving to the nominal capital stock. Note that an increase in the dividend rate (and 
also the interest rate), ceteris paribus, decreases the saving rate because income is transferred 
from firms with a saving propensity of unity to rentiers’ households with a saving propensity 
of presumably less than unity.
8
Two different functions for the accumulation rate (g), relating net investment (I) to the capital 
stock, are introduced. The first in equation (12a), based on the ‘stagnationist’ Kaleckian 
distribution and growth models, is an extension of the function employed in Hein (2006). The 
basic elements follow the arguments in Kalecki (1954) rather closely and assume that 
investment decisions are positively affected both by expected sales and by retained earnings. 
Expected sales are determined by the rate of capacity utilisation. Retained earnings are given 
                                                 
8 In our model, we consider only rentiers’ consumption out of current income flows. When shareholder value 
orientation is furthermore linked to increasing stock prices, it can be expected that rising (stock market) wealth 
further lowers the overall saving rate, in particular when households can borrow extensively against collateral, as 
described by Dutt (2006) and Bhaduri et al. (2006).  
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by the difference between profits and interest plus dividend payments, with each variable 
being normalised by the capital stock. Therefore, an increase in the interest rate or in the 
dividend rate has a negative impact on investment because firms’ internal funds for long-term 
investment finance are adversely affected. This also limits the access to external funds in 
imperfect capital markets, according to Kalecki’s (1937) ‘principle of increasing risk’. While 
the constant in the investment function (α) covers managements’ ‘animal spirits’ and desire 
for growth, as usually seen in Post-Keynesian or Kaleckian models of growth, we have further 
added a term indicating the influence of shareholder power, reflected by the dividend rate, on 
firms’ investment (ε). An increasing dividend rate affects investment adversely not only 
through the reduction of internal funds, but also through shareholder value orientation of 
management. 
The alternative accumulation function (equation 12b) is an extension of the function 
employed by Hein (2007a), and it is based on the investment function proposed by 
Bhaduri/Marglin (1990) in their non-monetary Kaleckian distribution and growth model. In 
this function we have again a positive effect of managements’ ‘animal spirits’ and of capacity 
utilisation on investment, and a negative effect of profits distributed to rentiers and of the 
degree of ‘shareholder value orientation’ of management. In contrast to the first accumulation 
function, we also have a positive effect of unit profits or the profit share on firms’ real 
investment decisions, following Bhaduri/Marglin. The model with the investment function 
(12a) close to Kalecki’s original ideas will be called the ‘Kaleckian model’, whereas the 
model with investment function (12b) will be termed the ‘Post-Kaleckian model’. 
The goods market equilibrium in both models is determined by the equality of saving and 
investment decisions (equation 13). The goods market stability conditions require that the 
saving rate responds more elastically to changes in capacity utilisation than capital 
accumulation does (equations 14a and 14b). Taken together, equations (1) - (11), (12a), (13) 
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and (14a) describe the Kaleckian model, whereas equations (1) - (11), (12b), (13) and (14b) 
represent the Post-Kaleckian model. 
For the Kaleckian model, we obtain the following goods market equilibrium values: 
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For the Post-Kaleckian model, the following goods market equilibrium values are derived: 
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In what follows, the effects of financialisation on stable goods market equilibria only will be 
discussed. Note that the importance of shareholder value orientation for managements’ 
investment decisions, indicated by ε in the investment function, has uniquely negative effects 
on the endogenous variables in both models. An increase in the dividend rate, however, has 
ambiguous effects. It affects firms’ investment decisions, but it also has an influence on the 
income of rentier households and hence consumption. If a change in the dividend rate is 
accompanied by a change in the mark-up, also distribution between capital and labour is 
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affected and there will be associated effects on consumption and on investment. In the 
following section we analyse the effects of an increasing dividend rate, as an indicator of 
shareholder value power, treating shareholder value orientation of managements’ investment 
decisions (ε) as a parameter. 
 
 
4. The effects of an increasing dividend rate 
 
Discussing the effects of an increasing dividend rate (d) associated with increasing 
shareholder power, we assume that the interest rate, the debt-capital ratio and the rentiers’ 
equity-capital-ratio each remain constant. For the Kaleckian model we get the following 
effects of a change in the dividend rate on the real equilibrium: 
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In the following discussion we distinguish the two cases regarding the effects of a change in 
the dividend rate on firms’ mark-up and hence on distribution between gross profits and 
wages. First, we assume the mark-up to be inelastic with respect to changes in the dividend 
rate, and then we will assume a dividend-elastic mark-up. 
 
4.1 The dividend-inelastic mark-up: increasing the dividend rate at the expense of firms’ 
retained profits 
In the case of a dividend-inelastic mark-up, distribution between gross profits and wages is 






, and the labour income share 
remains constant. We associate this case with a high degree of price competition in the goods 
market and with powerful labour unions in the labour market. 
 
4.1.1 The Kaleckian model 
The effects of a change in the dividend rate on the equilibrium rates of capacity utilisation, 
profit and capital accumulation may be positive or negative, depending on the parameter 
values in the saving and the investment function of the model. From equations (18a), (19a) 
and (20a) we obtain the following conditions for positive effects of a rising dividend rate on 
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Assuming the stability condition for the goods market equilibrium (equation 14a) to hold 








9 Therefore, we get the following regimes/cases for 
the Kaleckian model in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Effects of a change in the dividend rate in the Kaleckian model with a constant 
profit share, constant interest rate, and constant debt-capital- and equity-capital-ratios 
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The ‘normal’ case of a negative impact of an increase in the dividend rate throughout on the 
real equilibrium values of capacity utilisation, the profit rate and the rate of capital 
accumulation will be given if:  ρ +
γ
ε
< − 1 herefore, this case is the more likely the higher 
the rentiers’ propensity to save, the lower the rentiers’ equity-capital ratio, the higher the 
responsiveness of firms’ real investment with respect to internal funds and the more important 
shareholder value orientation is for firms’ investment decisions. With this parameter 
R s . T
                                                 
9 From the stability condition (1-ρ)(h/v) - β > 0, we get (h/v) - ρ(h/v) > β, and hence (h/v) > β + ρ(h/v). 
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constellation the increase in consumption demand associated with the redistribution of income 
from firms to rentiers’ households, triggered by a rising dividend rate, is insufficient to 
compensate for the negative effects on firms’ investment.  











low propensity to save out of rentiers’ income, a high rentiers’ equity-capital ratio, little 
importance of shareholder value orientation for firms’ investment decisions and high 
responsiveness of investment with respect to capacity utilisation allow for a positive effect of 
an increasing dividend rate on the equilibrium rates of capacity utilisation, profit and capital 
accumulation. Generally, we find that the more important ‘shareholder value orientation’ is in 
the firms’ accumulation function, the more likely becomes the ‘normal’ case, that is a 
negative effect of an increase in shareholder power and the dividend rate on the real 
equilibrium values. 










< − < ρ +
γ
ε
. In this 
case, an increase in the dividend rate is accompanied by a rising rate of capacity utilisation 
and a rising rate of profit due to improved capacity utilisation, but by a falling equilibrium 
rate of capital accumulation. What is required for the ‘intermediate’ case, on the one hand, are 
a relatively high rentiers’ equity-capital-ratio and a low rentiers’ propensity to save, which 
boost consumption demand in the face of a rising dividend rate, and a low responsiveness of 
firms’ investment with respect to internal funds which limits the negative effects on firms’ 
investment. On the other hand, however, in the ‘intermediate’ case we have a low 
responsiveness of investment with respect to capacity utilisation which, in sum, is not able to 
over-compensate the negative effects of a rise in the dividend rate through internal funds and 
shareholder value orientation. 
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4.1.2 The Post-Kaleckian model 
In the Post-Kaleckian model the effects of a change in the dividend rate on the real 
equilibrium values may also be either positive or negative, depending on the parameter values 
in the saving and investment functions. From equations (18b), (19b) and (20b) we obtain the 
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Assuming the stability condition for the goods market equilibrium (equation 14b) to hold 






10 Therefore, we get the following regimes/cases for the 
Post-Kaleckian model in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Effects of a change in the dividend rate in the Post-Kaleckian model with a 
constant profit share, constant interest rate, and constant debt-capital- and equity-
capital-ratios 
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10 From the stability condition (h/v) - β > 0, we get h > βv. 
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In the Post-Kaleckian model we also obtain a ‘normal’ and a ‘puzzling’ case, similar to the 
Kaleckian model. The ‘normal’ case with a negative effect of an increase in the dividend rate 




< − R s 1 . Therefore, this case becomes the more likely, the higher the rentiers’ 
propensity to save, the lower the rentiers’ equity-capital-ratio, the more important retained 
earnings are for investment and the more pronounced managements’ ‘shareholder value 
orientation’ is for firms’ investment decisions.  
The ‘puzzling’ case with a positive effect of an increasing dividend rate on the equilibrium 
rates of capacity utilisation, profit and capital accumulation is given if  R s 1
v
h











This case requires a low rentiers’ propensity to save, a high rentiers’ equity-capital-ratio, a 
high effect of capacity utilisation on firms’ investment, and a low impact of internal funds and 
‘shareholder value orientation’. A low profit share and a high capital-potential output-ratio 
make this case more likely, too. Whereas in the ‘normal’ case the stimulating effects of 
redistribution of profits from firms to rentiers’ household on consumption demand are not 
sufficient to over-compensate the restrictive effects on investment demand, in the ‘puzzling’ 
case this ‘over-compensation’ takes effect. Generally, again, the higher shareholder value 
orientation of management the more likely becomes the ‘normal’ case. 
















s 1 R . In this case, an increase in the dividend rate raises the 
equilibrium rates of capacity utilisation and profit, but decreases the equilibrium rate of 
capital accumulation. In the ‘intermediate’ case we have a low rentiers’ propensity to save and 
a high rentiers’ equity-capital ratio which allow for an increase in capacity utilisation and the 
rate of profit in the face of a moderate or weak effect of internal funds and shareholder value 
orientation on firms’ investment. But this constellation is insufficient to stimulate capital 
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accumulation because of a low impact of capacity utilisation on firms’ investment decisions. 
A low capital-potential output-ratio and a high profit share are also conducive to this 
constellation. 
 
4.2 The dividend-elastic mark-up: increasing the dividend rate at the expense of wage 
incomes 






 and the labour income share decreases in the face of 
a rising dividend rate. Retained profits of firms do not have to carry the whole burden or may 
even remain constant. This case will be associated with low price competition in the goods 
market and weak labour unions in the labour market. As will be seen below, for both models 
we obtain again positive or negative effects of a change in the dividend rate on the real 
equilibrium values. And also the negative impact of shareholder power on investment 
decisions and hence on real equilibrium is maintained in both models. 
 
4.2.1 The Kaleckian model 
From equations (18a), (19a) and (20a) we obtain the following conditions for a positive 
relation between the dividend rate and the equilibrium rates of capacity utilisation, profit and 
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Generally, the reduction of the labour income share associated with a rising dividend rate has 
a negative impact on effective demand and makes a positive effect of increasing dividend 
rates on capacity utilisation and the rate of profit, as in the ‘puzzling’ or in the ‘intermediate’ 
case, less likely, but not impossible (equations 18a, 18a’’, 19a, 19a’’). The effect of 
redistribution at the expense of labour on equilibrium capital accumulation is likely to be 
negative, too (equations 20a, 20a’’). But a positive relationship between the dividend rate and 
the accumulation rate remains possible, also with a dividend-elastic mark-up. Therefore, we 
obtain again the three cases/regimes discussed above, the ‘normal’, the ‘intermediate’ and the 
‘puzzling’ case, as is shown in Table 3, with the ‘intermediate’ and the ‘puzzling’ case 
becoming less likely with a dividend-elastic mark-up. 
 
Table 3: Effects of a change in the dividend rate in the Kaleckian model with a dividend-
elastic profit share, a constant interest rate, and constant debt-capital- and equity-
capital-ratios 
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s 1 R , because the 
term on the right hand side of equation (18a’’) is likely to be smaller than the right hand side 
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term in equation (19a’’).
11 And the right hand side term in (19a’’) is likely to be smaller than 
the one in (20a’’).
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. Provided that there is a strong 
accelerator effect in the investment function, a strong effect of the dividend rate on the profit 
share will increase the likelihood of the ‘normal’ case. 
 
4.2.2 The Post-Kaleckian model 
For the Post-Kaleckian model we obtain the following conditions for a positive relationship 
between the dividend rate and the equilibrium values of the rates of capacity utilisation, profit 
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Redistribution at the expense of labour following an increase in the dividend rate may either 
reduce or amplify the direct effects of a rising dividend rate on the rates of capacity 
utilisation, profit and capital accumulation. As can be seen from equations (18b) – (20b) and 
from (18b’’) – (20b’’) a high responsiveness of investment with respect to unit profits makes 
                                                 
11 The term [(1-ρ)u]/(vγ) in equation (18a’’) is likely to be smaller than (βu)/(γh) in equation (19a’’), because the 
numerator in the term from (18a’’) has only values below unity and the denominator has a variable (v) which 
may exceed unity, whereas the numerator in the term from (19a’’) has a variable which may exceed unity and 
the denominator has only variables below unity. 
12 Note that from the goods market stability condition it follows that (h/v)/[β+ρ(h/v)] > 1. 
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a positive effect of redistribution on the real variables – and hence a ‘puzzling’ or 
‘intermediate’ case for the effects of a changing dividend rate more likely. Generally, we 
obtain again the ‘normal’, an ‘intermediate’ and the ‘puzzling’ case/regime which are shown 
in Table 4.  
 
Table 4: Effects of a change in the dividend rate in the Post-Kaleckian model with a 
dividend-elastic profit share, a constant interest rate, and constant debt-capital- and 
equity-capital-ratios 
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s 1 R , because the term of the right 
hand side of equation (20b’’) is likely to be greater than the respective ones in equations 
(18b’’) and (19b’’).




































































































R . And the ‘puzzling’ case will 
                                                 
13 This due to the stability condition affecting the terms of the right hand side and the possible values for the 
variables of the right hand side of equations (18b’’) – (20b’’). 
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s 1 R . Note that a high elasticity of the 
profit share with respect to the dividend rate reduces the likelihood of the ‘intermediate’ and 





In the present paper we have integrated some – in our view – important tendencies associated 
with ‘financialisation’ into two different variants of the Kaleckian model of distribution and 
growth, a Kaleckian model with a basic investment function close to Kalecki’s original 
writings and a Post-Kaleckian model based on an extension of the investment function 
proposed by Bhaduri/Marglin (1990). We have associated ‘financialisation’ with rising power 
of shareholders which has caused increasing ‘shareholder value’ orientation of the firms’ 
management with a partially negative effect on firms’ investment in capital stock (‘downsize 
and distribute’ instead of ‘retain and invest’). Rising power of shareholders is also associated 
with an increasing dividend rate. We have taken into account that increasing dividend 
payments not only affect firms’ investment negatively but also affect rentiers’ household 
consumption positively. Finally, we have also taken into account that expansive effects of 
increasing dividend payments may be contradicted if they are accompanied by a rising mark-
up and hence a falling wage share. 
We have shown that rising ‘shareholder value orientation’ of management’s investment 
decisions with a constant dividend rate has a uniquely negative effect on capacity utilisation, 
the profit rate and capital accumulation in both our models. An associated increase in 
distributed profits through an increase in the dividend rate, however, has contradicting effects 
on the economy. We have shown that in both our Kaleckian models the ‘normal’ case of a 
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negative effect throughout the endogenous variables, the ‘puzzling’ case of a positive effect 
throughout, and an ‘intermediate’ case with a positive effect on capacity utilisation and the 
profit rate and with a negative effect on capital accumulation may arise, depending on the 
parameter values in the investment and the saving function of the models.  
If an increasing dividend rate is accompanied by a rising mark-up in firms’ pricing decisions 
and hence by a falling wage share, in the Kaleckian model the ‘puzzling’ and the 
‘intermediate’ cases become less likely and a negative effect on capacity utilisation, the rate 
of profit and capital accumulation is more probable. In the Post-Kaleckian model the direction 
of the effects of redistribution at the expense of labour mainly depends on the elasticity of 
investment with respect to unit profits or the profit share. A very high elasticity will make the 
‘puzzling’ and ‘intermediate’ cases more likely. With a low elasticity the ‘normal’ case will 
become more probable. 
‘Profits without investment’, the ‘intermediate’ case in both models, is a possible medium- or 
long-run accumulation regime in the approach developed here. However, if a rising dividend 
rate is associated with a major increase in the mark-up and hence with redistribution at the 
expense of labour, the possibility of such a regime will be undermined, provided that unit 
profits do not have a strong effect on firms’ real investment. Also, the larger the negative 
effect of a given degree of shareholder power, reflected in the dividend rate, on managements’ 
investment decisions, the lower are the prospects for the ‘puzzling’ and ‘intermediate’ cases. 
Therefore, both tendencies will make a negative effect of an increasing dividend rate on the 
rates of capacity utilisation, profit and capital accumulation, and hence on real development 
more likely. Finally, it should be noted that an ‘intermediate’ regime, if it prevails for a 
certain period of time, will face long-run problems caused by the effects of weak real 
investment on the size of the capital stock and on productivity growth, as far as the latter is 
embodied in capital stock. Although being characterised by a high level of activity and a high 
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profit rate in the short and medium run, this regime will therefore face long-run growth, 
employment and inflation problems.
14
                                                 
14 For the effects of capital stock growth on GDP growth, employment and inflation see 
Arestis/Baddeley/Sawyer (2006, 2007), Arestis/Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal, (2000), Arestis/Sawyer (2004: 73-
99, 2005b), Leon-Ledesma/Thirlwall (2002), Rowthorn (1995, 1999), and Sawyer (2002). 
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